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I. INTRODUCTION
As a trial judge, sitting on my woolsack with the best seat in
the house, observing detachedly the fight to the finish that I am
umpiring, I sometimes wonder at what seems to me the passing up
of golden opportunities by the able advocate. Foremost among
these lost opportunities is the virtual total neglect to do anything
about the other side's hearsay once it has been admitted by the
trial judge into evidence.
True enough, the able advocate fought valiantly against the
hearsay admission; but, having lost that position, he does not fall
back to the next logical position - impeaching the hearsay declar-
ant. Rather, the advocate appears to abandon altogether his battle
against the hearsay declarant. Whether this abandonment is due to
exhaustion of energy or unawareness of the fact that impeachment
possibilities exist, I do not know.
Clearly, this is an important omission by the litigator. After
all, hearsay is a commonplace item in all trials, civil and criminal.
Future years and future trials will evidence an even greater use of
hearsay as "the prohibition against hearsay ... faces extinction."'
As one commentator has written:
The judicial commitment to admissibility under the federal rules
[of evidence] is clearest in hearsay. The decisions . . . about hear-
say have created theories and precedents to admit almost all pro-
bative hearsay . . . in reality, important hearsay is seldom ex-
cluded .... That is true even if the hearsay seems to fit none of
the express exceptions. The lawyer who proffers hearsay should
no longer ask, "Can I get it in?" but "How do I get it in?"2
With this in mind, trial judges and attorneys should be aware of
the possibilities for impeaching hearsay evidence.
In attempting to plot out an outline for this article, I have
decided, as Rule 806 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence itself
attempts, to treat the hearsay declarant as though he was an at-
trial witness. Using the nine modes of impeachment recognized by
1. Rossi, The Silent Revolution, 9 A.B.A. J. Litigation 13 (1983).
2. Id. at 14.
[Vol. 13:157
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the common law, I will examine some of the possibilities for im-
peaching hearsay declarants.3 As I explore each mode, I will dis-
cuss whether extrinsic, as well as intrinsic, evidence may be used to
impeach the hearsay evidence.
The latter part of this article addresses four problem areas
stemming from Rule 806 or from an extension of its principles.
First, the article discusses impeachment of the non-hearsay facts
or data that an expert witness uses to base his at-trial expert opin-
ions upon. Second, the article explores the extent to which a de-
fense attorney is entitled to discovery of co-defendants' and/or co-
conspirators' statements. Third, the article addresses the possible
admission of supporting evidence when the credibility of a hearsay
declarant has been attacked. Fourth, the article examines the right
of a party opposing a hearsay statement to call and cross-examine
the hearsay declarant as a witness.
II. THE RATIONALE OF RULE 806
Before we begin our inquiry into the modes of impeachment
and other problem areas, it is important to familiarize ourselves
with Rule 806. The rationale behind Rule 806 is sufficiently stated
by the Advisory Committee's Note in the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence: "The declarant of a hearsay statement which is admitted in
evidence is in effect a witness. His credibility should in fairness be
subject to impeachment and support as though he had in fact
testified."4
North Carolina's Rule 806, entitled "Attacking and Support-
ing Credibility of Declarants," is constructed of three sentences:
1. When a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence,
the credibility of the declarant may be attacked, and if attacked
may be supported, by evidence which would be admissible for
those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness.
2. Evidence of a statement or conduct by the declarant at
anytime, inconsistent with his hearsay statement, is not subject to
any requirement that he may have been afforded an opportunity
to deny or explain.
3. If the party against whom a hearsay statement has been
admitted calls the declarant as a witness, the party is entitled to
3. I. YOUNGER, THE ADVOCATE'S DESKBOOK: THE ESSENTIALS OF TRYING A CASE
§§ 15.1-.5, at 251-78 (1988) [hereinafter YOUNGER].
4. FED. R. EVID. 806 advisory committee's note.
1991]
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examine him on the statement as if under cross-examination.
Sentence one employs a pattern of equivalency.' Sentence two
is the only exception to this pattern of equivalency.7 It allows a
party to impeach an out of court declarant by evidence of his in-
consistent statements, whether or not he has been "afforded an op-
portunity to deny or explain."8
III. THE NINE MODES OF IMPEACHMENT
As commonly recognized, there are nine ways in which a trial
lawyer may impeach witnesses.9 The first four modes of impeach-
ment deal with elements of competence and eligibility even to be a
witness.10 Modes five through nine seek to discredit the testimony
(but not the competency or eligibility) of the witness.11
A. Oath and/or Affirmation
A witness testifying at trial must take either an oath or affir-
mation to tell the truth. 12 Clearly, this is an impossibility for most
types of hearsay. 13 Even for a witness at trial, credibility impair-
ment or enhancement based on religious belief or opinions is flatly
barred by Rule 610.14 But, there is nothing in the law that prevents
a good lawyer from stressing to the jury that one of the reasons
they might discount the hearsay is that it was not said under oath,
one of the traditional tests for truthfulness.
B. Perception
Perception, or the ability to perceive, is a question of testimo-
5. N.C.R. EVID. 806.
6. 4 D. LoUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 501, at 1240 (1985)
[hereinafter LOUISELL & MUELLER].
7. Id.
8. Id. (quoting FED. R. EvID. 806).
9. YOUNGER, supra note 3, § 15.2, at 253.
10. Id. at 254.
11. See id. §§ 15.4-.5, at 263-78.
12. FED. R. EVID. 603; N.C.R. EVID. 603.
13. Former testimony admitted under 804(b)(1) is supported by an oath or
affirmation and is therefore an exception. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
14. Rule 610 of the Federal Rules of Evidence changed the rule adopted in
the historical case of Carver v. United States, 164 U.S. 694 (1897) (stating that a
hearsay declarant of a dying declaration (now governed by Rule 804(b)(2)) could
"be discredited by proof ... that [the deceased] did not believe in a future state
of rewards or punishments").
160
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nial competency. Here, the law is basically dealing with a witness's
five senses. Could the testifying witness see the things he says he
saw, hear the things he says he heard, smell the things he says he
smelled, feel the things he says he touched, tasted the things he
says he tasted?
It is conceivable that an opposing lawyer could show on voir
dire that an alleged excited utterance eyewitness, 5 having a cane
in one hand and his seeing eye dog's leash in the other, was in fact
legally blind on the date in question and therefore could not have
been an eyewitness. More likely, however, such question as to
whether the hearsay declarant could have perceived what he said
he perceived will not be resolved by the trial judge as a question of
law or competency. Rather, it will be left to the opposing advocate
to impeach the credibility of the hearsay declarant, making it a
question of fact for the jury.
How is the opposing lawyer to proceed? First, of course, he
may cross-examine the witness on the stand who has just uttered
the hearsay statement allegedly made by the hearsay declarant.
For example the opposing lawyer might ask:
Q: "Now sir, isn't it a fact that the hearsay declarant eyewit-
ness (1) had prescribed eyeglasses one inch thick and (2) he
didn't even have them on at the time of the event he allegedly
spoke about?"
Clearly, a "yes" answer to these two questions will have sufficiently
impeached the hearsay declarant. But, what if the witness either
denies or says he does not know the answer to these questions? Is
counsel bound by his answer? Or can opposing counsel do some-
thing to prove the truth of these cross-examination questions?
Generally speaking, the answer to these questions depends
upon whether the matter is determined to be collateral or not. If a
matter is collateral - it does not relate to facts which are material
to the trial - the questioner is bound by the answer of a witness.
But, if the matter relates. to material facts in the testimony of the
witness, it is not collateral and may be proved by other evidence,
including other witnesses. 6 The offer of such proof by other wit-
15. "Excited utterance eyewitness" refers to an eyewitness who makes a
statement "relating to a startling event or condition ... while ... under the stress
of excitement caused by the event or condition." FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
16. 1 H. BRANDIS, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 44, at 203, §48, at 224 (3d ed.
1988) [hereinafter BRANDIS].
1991]
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nesses is called extrinsic evidence or extrinsic proof.'7 The subject
matter of the witness testifying about the hearsay declarant's abil-
ity to perceive the matters spoken about is material and not
collateral.
A case that demonstrates these points is State v. Howard.8
Mr. Clough, terminally ill with cancer, received non-medical
(quack) treatment from the defendants and was hospitalized with
burns as a result. 9 While in the hospital, Clough gave a written
statement to the police regarding the words and deeds of the de-
fendants."0 Before trial, Clough died; and, at trial the prosecutor
introduced his statement into evidence. 2
The trial court allowed the defense the opportunity, on cross-
examination of the police officer who had taken the deceased's
statement, to explore the "apparent state of mind of Clough at the
time the statement was taken."2 In addition, the defense exten-
sively examined Clough's burn treatment doctor as to what medi-
cation Clough had taken prior to the time the written statement
was given, as well as the possible effects of the medication.2 3
The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the state-
ment by Clough concerned material facts and was therefore admis-
sible.24 As this statement was non-collateral, the trial court prop-
erly allowed the defense to offer extrinsic evidence as to Clough's
competence.25
C. Memory and Recollection
Memory and recollection simply require a witness, or hearsay
declarant, to remember the matters they are speaking about. The
same rules and guidelines apply to memory and recollection as ap-
ply to the mode of perception.
17. J. MCELHANEY, TRIAL NOTEBOOK 280-81 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter
MCELHANEY].
18. 78 N.C. App. 262, 337 S.E.2d 598 (1985), cert. denied, 316 N.C. 198, 341
S.E.2d 581 (1986).
19. State v. Howard, 78 N.C. App. 262, 265, 337 S.E.2d 598, 601 (1985), cert.
denied, 316 N.C. 198, 341 S.E.2d 581 (1986).
20. Id. at 271, 337 S.E.2d at 604.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 272, 373 S.E.2d at 605.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 271, 373 S.E.2d at 604.
25. Id. at 272, 373 S.E.2d at 605.
[Vol. 13:157
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D. Communication
Generally, a witness must have the ability to perceive and
communicate, in some rational manner, the substance of what he
perceived.2 Because a hearsay declarant does not appear before
the court, the question arises as to how the opposing lawyer is to
assess the declarant's communication ability.
During examination of an at-trial witness, the opposing lawyer
will size up the witness and develop opinions as to the witness's
intelligence and credibility.2 7 The same is true in the case of a
hearsay declarant. The lawyer, through the witness on the stand,
develops impressions of the hearsay declarant's level of intelligence
and ability to communicate. When the lawyer realizes the hearsay
declarant has been credited with communicating a statement that
is clearly outside of his intellectual capacity to understand, the
probability that the declarant has done nothing more than act like
a human tape recorder is likely.
Take, for example,2" a situation where the witness relates on
direct examination that the hearsay declarant told him the defend-
ant practiced antidisestablishmentarianism. 29 The cross-examining
lawyer will attempt to impeach the hearsay declarant by showing
that the declarant simply did not have the intellectual ability to
understand the word "antidisestablishmentarianism. "30
Q: "Isn't it a fact that [your hearsay declarant] could not spell,
pronounce, or understand any word larger than a four-letter
obscenity?"
A: "No."
Later, on direct examination, the lawyer questions one of his own
witnesses in the following manner:
Q: "Isn't it a fact that [the other side's hearsay declarant] did not
understand any word with more than four letters?"
A: "Yes, that is true."
Finally, in summation, the lawyer should attempt to persuade the
26. YOUNGER, supra note 3, § 15.2, at 255.
27. Id. § 15.2, at 260.
28. Because there are so few examples of impeachment of hearsay declarants
under this mode, I have reworked an example used for live witnesses contained in
YOUNGER, supra note 3, § 15.2, at 260..
29. Id.
30. Id.
1991]
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jury that the hearsay declarant is in fact intellectually incapable of
understanding the act he has accused the defendant of practicing.
E. Bias, Prejudice, Interest, Motive, Corruption
Now, we begin to dig deeply into the heart of our topic. "In
very jurisdiction [North Carolina included] you may impeach a
witness by showing that he is biased, prejudiced (not generally, but
against someone or something in this case), interested or corrupt..
. ."" What if the witness denies such bias, prejudice, interest or
corruption? The subject matter is not collateral, it directly affects
the credibility of the witness, and the cross-examiner may contra-
dict the witness by other evidence. Clearly, the impeacher of a
hearsay declarant may show bias, etc. of the hearsay declarant by
other evidence, too.
Of some interest is the fact that the entire area of bias, et
cetera, was omitted from the language of the Federal and North
Carolina Rules of Evidence.32 Perhaps this is true because this sub-
ject matter was so obvious and so well known. In any event, the
legal standing of this most important item affecting witness credi-
bility has now been judicially recognized by the United States Su-
preme Court as being explicit in the common law and implied
within the Rules of Evidence. 3
Two federal circuit cases that demonstrate this use of bias, et
cetera for impeachment purposes are United States v. Check34 and
United States v. Lechoco.3 5 The first case, Check, is a wild one. At
31. Id. at 263. "If the judge curtails cross-examination involving this particu-
lar mode of impeachment, there is a. likelihood of reversal on appeal." Id.
32. However, bias is mentioned in the advisory committee's note to several
sections of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See e.g., FED. R. EvID. 608, 610 advisory
committee's notes.
33. See United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984). There is much wisdom in
this well written and well decided opinion. For instance, it stated that "[a trial]
court is accorded a wide discretion in determining the admissibility of the evi-
dence under the Federal Rules." Id. at 54.
Any reading of the appellate decisions in North Carolina as compared with a
reading of the federal appellate courts will, I submit, convince the reader that our
state appellate courts treat most state trial court evidence rulings as being mat-
ters of law, hence reversible error if the appellate judges have a different view of
what should have been admitted. The federal appellate courts appear in fact to
honor the rules that make most evidence rulings discretionary, hence only to be
reversed for abuse of discretion.
34. 582 F.2d 668 (2d Cir. 1978).
35. 542 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
[Vol. 13:157
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trial the defense was allowed to ask an undercover police witness,
who had just testified to what a hearsay declarant had said, if he
was aware that the hearsay declarant "was facing a serious crimi-
nal charge in state court. ... "36 The court found the "impeach-
ment technique employed by the defense was entirely proper. 37
Apparently, this question was allowed to show the possible motive
of the hearsay declarant to have made the statement he had made.
The second case, Lechoco, is wilder yet and involves many of
the aspects of this entire article. In Lechoco, the defendant was on
trial for taking an ambassador hostage.3 8 In support of his insanity
defense, Lechoco called several psychiatric witnesses with whom he
had spoken.39 Lechoco's statements to these doctors were admitted
into evidence.40 The prosecutor, in an attempt to discredit the doc-
tors' testimony and raise issues as to Lechoco's truthfulness, quite
properly cross-examined these defense doctors by asking if it was
not true (1) that their diagnoses depended upon the defendant's
truthfulness and (2) that the defendant had the motive and desire
to be acquitted.' 1
The defendant did not testify at his trial.2 However, the de-
fense offered a witness to testify that the defendant, now a hearsay
declarant, had a "reputation for truthfulness and honesty.' 43 The
trial court excluded this testimony." The appellate court reversed,
stating that the prosecution's cross-examination of the defense
doctors dwelt upon "the defendant's motive to fabricate a de-
fense."' 5 Thus, the court held that the trial court should have al-
lowed the defense to repel the attack by offering evidence of the
defendant's character for truthfulness. "6
State v. Honeycutt.47 illustrates that North Carolina follows
this same rule. Honeycutt involved the third round of a murder
36. United States v. Check, 582 F.2d 668, 684 (2d Cir. 1978).
37. Id.
38. United States v. Lechoco, 542 F.2d 84, 85 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
39. Id. at 86.
40. Id. at 87.
41. Id. at 86-87.
42. Id. at 88.
43. Id. at 87.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 89.
46. Id. at 88.
47. 21 N.C. App. 342, 204 S.E.2d 238, cert. denied, 285 N.C. 593, 205 S.E.2d
725 (1974).
1991]
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case.' 8 There had been two earlier trials in which the State's only
eyewitness, DeBerry, had testified."9 In both trials, the jury had
hung and the case mistried.50 For this, the third trial, DeBerry was
unavailable as a witness,5" as he had become a fugitive from jus-
tice, so the transcript of DeBerry's earlier testimony was read to
the jury.52 On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held
that the trial judge erroneously refused to allow the defendant to
testify about an earlier altercation between himself and DeBerry,
which would have tended to show bias on DeBerry's part.53
F. Prior Convictions
Prior convictions of a witness are clearly covered and con-
trolled by Evidence Rule 609.5" Other than oath, affirmation, and
religious beliefs, neither the Federal nor the North Carolina Rules
of Evidence mention any mode of impeachment until we reach
prior convictions. 5
In practice, the issue of whether a matter is collateral or non-
48. Id.
49. State v. Honeycutt, 21 N.C. App. 342, 342, 204 S.E.2d 238, 238 (1974).
50. Id..at 343, 204 S.E.2d at 239.
51. N.C.R. EvID. 804(a)(5).
52. Honeycutt, 21 N.C. App. at 342, 204 S.E.2d at 238.
53. Id. at 343, 204 S.E.2d at 239.
54. Federal Rule 609 (a), as effective December 1, 1990, provides in part:
(a) For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
(1) evidence that a witness other than an accused has been convicted
of a crime shall be admitted ... if the crime was punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the wit-
ness was convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted of
such a crime shall be admitted if the court determines that the probative
value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the
accused; and
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be
admitted if it involved dishonesty of false statement, regardless of the
punishment.
FED. R. EvID. 609(a).
North Carolina Rule 609(a) reads: "General Rule - For the purpose of at-
tacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime
punishable by more than 60 days confinement shall be admitted if elicited from
him or established by public record during cross-examination or thereafter."
N.C.R. EvID. 609(a).
Note carefully the large differences between Federal Rule 609(a) and North
Carolina Rule 609(a). North Carolina's rule is straighter, cleaner, simpler, and far
better.
55. YOUNGER, supra note 3, § 15.4, at 268.
[Vol. 13:157
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collateral will not arise with respect to prior convictions. This is
true simply because when the witness is asked whether he has been
convicted of a crime, he knows a public record of the crime exists.
Ordinarily, he will simply not deny it. However, if the witness does
deny the conviction, the matter is not collateral. The lawyer will be
allowed to prove the conviction by other evidence but "will be lim-
ited . . . to the most efficient evidence available: the certified or
exemplified judgment of conviction. 56
There is some question as to whether or not proof of prior
convictions will be a problem for lawyers in North Carolina since
North Carolina failed to enact Rule 803(22). 57 Rule 803(22) allows
as an exception to the rule against hearsay, judgments of previous
convictions.5 1
The unanswered questions in North Carolina are just how and
when the impeaching lawyer can logistically "establish by public
record during cross-examination or thereafter" 59 the prior criminal
convictions of the hearsay declarant. The interplay or fit between
Rules 806 and 609 is awkward at best. Therefore, the trial judge
will probably have to fit the two together by main strength, force,
and awkwardness (as with many at-trial rulings and procedures). °
After all, the point of all hearsay is that it is not subject to cross-
examination. If the hearsay reciter on the witness stand is not
aware of the hearsay declarant's criminal convictions and the
words "or thereafter" in North Carolina Rule 609(a) are taken to
mean that the impeaching lawyer must wait until his time to offer
56. Id. at 269.
57. Rule 803(22) provides a hearsay exception for "[e]vidence of a final judg-
ment, entered after a trial or upon a plea of guilty, adjudging a person guilty of a
crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year. See FED.
R. EVID. 803(22).
The commentary to North Carolina's rules provides:
Under current North Carolina practice, the judgment or finding of a
court generally cannot be used in another case as evidence of the fact
found, except where the principle of res judicata is involved.... By not
adopting a hearsay exception for judgments of previous convictions, it is
intended that North Carolina practice with respect to previous convic-
tions remain the same.
N.C.R. EvID. 803 commentary (citations omitted).
58. See FED. R. EVID. 803(22), supra note 57.
59. N.C.R. EvID. 609(a).
60. The same type of problem may also exist for federal judges since the
amended version of Federal Rule 609(a) is totally silent as to how and when law-
yers may impeach by useof a judgment of conviction.
1991]
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evidence, then the lawyer, under North Carolina procedure
(though not under federal criminal procedure), faces a new di-
lemma. If he offers any evidence, he loses the last argument to the
jury.
My trial judge's suggested solution is analogous to the proce-
dure authorized by Rule 106.61 I recommend that the trial judge
first allow the cross-examining, impeaching lawyer to question the
witness on the stand. This is most effective if, for example, the
witness is a police officer and you feel he probably can affirma-
tively answer these questions. In the alternative, or in addition, the
trial judge can allow the impeaching lawyer to stand up and read
aloud to the jury the prior criminal convictions of the hearsay
declarant.
A good example of this impeachment technique is illustrated
below:
In an automobile negligence action, plaintiff introduces the
deposition of Jones, who has recently died. Since Jones is unavail-
able, his deposition transcript qualifies as former testimony under
FRE 804(b)(1) .... [T]he defendant can introduce the fact that
Jones was convicted of perjury five years ago, since this prior con-
viction is admissible to attack Jones' credibility under FRE 609.
This would be done by introducing a certified copy of Jones' rec-
ord of conviction.2
This situation is governed by FRE 806. Since the declarant is
not in court, it is impossible to ask him the questions normally
required on cross examination. However, the opponent can intro-
duce extrinsic evidence to impeach the out-of-court declarant
whenever the impeachment is non-collateral. 3
At least two major problem areas may arise that we must deal
with as to prior convictions. The first of these, the co-conspirator
imbroglio, stems from the inclusion of Federal Rule 801(d)(2)(E) in
Federal Rule 806.4 Here the prosecution may be faced with a di-
61. North Carolina's Rule 106 provides that "[w]hen a writing or recorded
statement... is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require him at that
time to introduce any other . . .writing or recorded statement which ought in
fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it." N.C.R. EvID. 106.
62. T. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES 261 (2d ed. 1988).
63. Id at 260.
64. Compare the language of Federal Rule 801(d)(2)(E): "a statement is not
hearsay if ... the statement is offered against a party and is... a statement by a
co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy"
with North Carolina's Rule 801(d)(E) which reads: "a statement is admissible as
[Vol. 13:157
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lemma where one of two or more co-conspirators has made an in-
criminating statement against the conspirators and that statement
is admissible under the co-conspirator exemption/exception. What
happens in this situation? Early commentary suggested that if the
maker of the incriminating statement was joined in trial with other
co-conspirators, prejudice may result from their attempts to im-
peach him as a declarant6 5 The maker of the statement should
argue that a limiting instruction would not be enough of a safe-
guard and that the prosecution ought to have to forego either join-
der or use of the statement." 6
But events, even before the commentary appeared in 1987,
have established its author was a poor prophet. Take, for example,
United States v. Robinson, 7 where the defendant was placed on
trial along with two other co-conspirators on drug charges.' 8 At
trial, the prosecution introduced co-conspirator statements against
all three defendants under Federal Rule 801(d)(2)(E)6 9 All three
defendants indicated that (1) none of them would take the stand,
yet (2) each of them, pursuant to Rule 806, wanted to present evi-
dence of each defendant's/co-conspirator's/declarant's prior crimi-
nal convictions for the purpose of impeaching them as hearsay de-
clarants; or, in the alternative, each wanted a severance of his own
trial from his co-defendants'.7
The trial court denied both alternative motions and this was
upheld on appeal .7 The appellate court, citing United States v.
an exception to the hearsay rule if it is offered against a party and it is . . . a
statement by a co-conspirator of such party during the course and in furtherance
of the conspiracy." FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E); N.C.R. EVID. 801(d)(E).
North Carolina's Rule 806 does not include an equivalent to Federal Rule
801(d)(2)(E). The rationale for this omission is articulated in the commentary to
Rule 806. Under Federal Rule 801 admissions by a party-opponent are not hear-
say statements. North Carolina Rule 801(d)(E) treats such statements as excep-
tions to the hearsay rule. Therefore, the inclusion of Rule 801(d)(E) in Rule 806
would be superfluous. See N.C.R. EVID. 806 commentary.
Under both North Carolina and federal law co-conspirator statements are ad-
mitted. The only difference is that in North Carolina such admissions are excep-
tions' to the hearsay rule while such statements are treated as exemptions (non-
hearsay) under the federal rules.
65. P. ROTHSTEIN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 439 (2d ed. 1979).
66. Id.
67. 783 F.2d 64 (7th Cir. 1986).
68. United States v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 64, 65 (7th Cir. 1986).
69. Id. at 67.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 68.
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Bovain,72 treated both decisions as being within the trial court's
discretion and found no abuse of discretion.7 3 As to the denial of
impeachment under Rule 806, the court held:
[t]he trial court judge in this case pursued a course which is, on
balance, more favorable to defendants than the Bovain solution.
Weighing the value to each co-defendant of being able to impeach
the credibility of the others against the prejudice to each of hav-
ing his criminal convictions before the jury, the judge elected to
protect the defendants' presumption of innocence by refusing to
allow impeachment with evidence of prior convictions.7 '
The appellate court appeared to sum up the trial court's denial of
the defendant's severance motions by saying that the defendants
"were erroneously assuming that admission of the prior crimes evi-
1$75dence would automatically entitle them to severance....
Lawyers reeling from the Robinson holding must now encoun-
ter the Freddie Kruger7 1 of the co-conspirator trials, Bovain. In
Bovain the prosecutor tried one Finch and one Rickett for drug
offenses. 7 The prosecutor called as a witness a former member of
the conspiracy who testified at length to co-conspirator statements
made by Finch about the criminal activities of Rickett 8 Neither
Finch nor Rickett testified at trial.79 Rickett moved to introduce
certified records of Finch's larceny and drug convictions for pur-
poses of impeaching Finch as a hearsay declarant under Rule 806.80
The trial court allowed the non-testifying defendant Finch's crimi-
nal convictions pursuant to Rule 609.81 But, the trial judge, pursu-
ant to Rule 105, limited admissibility and carefully instructed the
jury that the evidence of Finch's convictions could only be used to
impeach or discredit his hearsay declarations. 2 These prior convic-
72. 708 F.2d 606 (11th Cir. 1983).
73. United States v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 64, 68 (7th Cir. 1986).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Freddie Kruger was the terrifying dream master in the movie, Nightmare
on Elm Street.
77. United States v. Bovain, 708 F.2d 606 (11th Cir. 1983).
78. Id. at 613.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. It should be noted that the ten (10) year time limit for prior convic-
tions runs back from the time of making of the statement, not from its use at
trial. 4 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 6, § 501, at 1253.
82. United States v. Bovain, 708 F.2d at 606, 613 (11th Cir. 1983).
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tions could not be considered as substantive evidence of Finch's
guilt.83
A second problem area deals with what happens to the de-
fendant who manages to get his own self-serving hearsay state-
ments received in evidence. After all, it's not unusual for a District
Attorney to put a mixed statement in, part harmful and part help-
ful. Clearly, the defendant will not want to invoke Rule 806 and
impeach himself as a hearsay declarant by introducing his prior
criminal convictions. That's like pulling the pin on a grenade, then
holding it close to your breast like Cleopatra did her asp! But what
the defense won't do, the prosecution will be able to do under Rule
607, which states quite simply, "[t]he credibility of a witness may
be attacked by any party, including the party calling the
witness"!84
United States v. Newman8 5 proves this point. The defendant's
self-serving statements made to others were received into evi-
dence. The defendant did not testify.8 7 The prosecutor was al-
lowed to put in evidence of certified copies of the defendant's
criminal convictions.8 This, of course, led to the following Rule
105 limiting instruction:
The evidence on Mr. Newman's convictions which you have just
heard is only to be considered by you as possible impeachment of
Mr. Newman's out-of-court statements. You may not consider
these past convictions as evidence in any way of Mr. Newman's
guilt on the charges presently before you. 9
G. Prior Bad Acts
Rule 608(b) limits the old North Carolina common law as to
the impeachment of a witness for his non-conviction bad acts. In
essence, the Rule states: "Specific instances of the conduct of a
83. Id.
84. FED. R. EVID. 607. Under Rule 806, there is no doubt that any party may
seek to discredit the hearsay declarant, including the party who introduced his
hearsay statement. See 4 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 6, § 501, at 1240 (cit-
ing FED. R. EVID. 806).
85. 849 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1988). See also United States v. Noble, 754 F.2d
1324 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 818 (1985); United States v. Lawson, 608
F.2d 1129 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1091 (1980).
86. United States v. Newman, 849 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1988).
87. Id. at 161-63.
88. Id. at 163.
89. Id.
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witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility.
. . may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in
the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruth-
fulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness...
"90
This language would appear to say, using old but still familiar
North Carolina language, that the cross-examiner is bound by the
answer of the witness about his earlier bad acts tending to show a
lack of truthfulness. In other words, the opposing lawyer is prohib-
ited from putting on evidence himself about the opposing witness's
bad acts.
What is the defense lawyer to do? Rule 608(b) speaks literally
of (1) asking the witness on the stand about prior bad acts and (2)
being barred from introducing extrinsic evidence." Take, for ex-
ample, a situation where the defense/opposing lawyer asks the wit-
ness, who has just testified on direct examination to what the hear-
say declarant said about the defendant:
Q: "Isn't it a fact that the hearsay declarant lied to the IRS about
his money laundering operations?"
A: "I don't know anything about that."
Now what is the defense lawyer to do? A literal application of
Rule 608(b) treats the matter as collateral. Therefore, the inquiry
stops, and the defense lawyer is out of luck.2
There is one form of impeachment that may be unavailable: im-
peachment by prior bad acts. Since Rule 608 restricts impeach-
ment to questions addressed to a witness on the stand and binds
the examiner to the answers, it may well be that bad act impeach-
ment of a hearsay declarant who is not present to testify will be
impermissible.13
But since this result runs counter to the philosophical pattern
of equivalency that Rule 806 is supposed to embody, let me offer
you better counsel and commentary which treats the matter as
non-collateral, therefore allowing further inquiry.
Rule 806 should be read as modifying the otherwise applicable
Rule [608] to the extent of permitting extrinsic evidence of such
90. FED. R. EVID. 608(b) (emphasis added).
91. Id. Extrinsic evidence which is barred by Rule 608(b) is generally defined
as evidence outside the cross-examination. McELHANEY, supra note 17, at 281.
92. 1 G. JOSEPH & S. SALTZBURG, EVIDENCE IN AMERICA, § 42, at 7 (1990).
93. Id.
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misconduct [prior bad acts]. Otherwise the attacking party' could
employ this form of attack only if the out-of-court declarant took
the witness stand, or perhaps if he were unavailable, and it is un-
fair to restrict the attack: The impeaching party ought not to be
put to the burden of calling the declarant to the stand even if he
is available, since his adversary has adduced the statement which
gave rise to the need for impeachment.'
One pre-rule North Carolina case is of interest here, at least
for its literal, conservative approach to the then existing law of im-
peachment of a dying declaration declarant. In State v. Stevens9 5
the trial judge refused to let the defense introduce a deceased's
record of criminal convictions to impeach the deceased declarant.9 '
The defendant's argument was that had the deceased lived and
testified, he could have been cross-examined about his convictions.
• .and since such cross-examination is impossible in the case of a
dying declaration, the deceased declarant's criminal record should
have been admitted in lieu of cross-examination." The supreme
court disagreed with the defendant's argument and affirmed the
trial court's ruling.
9 8
Since Stevens is a pre-rule decision and deals with what is
now Rule 609, not Rule 608 (which is the subject of this inquiry), it
is neither controlling nor persuasive on this current issue. I side
with the better -thought-out and fairer position, where Rule 806
modifies the limiting effect of Rule 608 and allows extrinsic evi-
dence of the declarant's prior bad acts.
One fairly recent and well publicized case provides a good ex-
ample of what happens when you plug Rule 608(b) into Rule 806.
In United States v. Friedman9 9 the trial judge allowed the prose-
cutor to put in evidence numerous hearsay statements made by
Manes as co-conspirator declarations pursuant to Federal Rule
801(d)(2)(E). 100 The defense, in an attempt to impeach Manes as a
94. 4 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 6, § 501, at 1241.
95. 295 N.C. 21, 243 S.E.2d 771 (1978). See generally 1 BRANDIS, supra note
16, § 111, at 482 n.40.
96. State v. Stevens, 295 N.C. 21, 34, 243 S.E.2d 771, 779 (1978).
97. Id. at 34, 243 S.E.2d at 779.
98. Id.
99. 854 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1988). In this case, the defendants were convicted
of turning a City of New York department into a RICO racketeering enterprise
for the financial benefit of themselves and their political friends, one of whom,
Donald Manes, was a major figure in New York politics, until his suicide in the
spring of 1986.
100. United States v. Friedman, 854 F.2d 535, 569 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. de-
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hearsay declarant, offered evidence of Manes' prior bad acts.101 De-
fense evidence tended to show that Manes had lied to law enforce-
ment authorities about his first unsuccessful suicide attempt.102
Manes was found bleeding from slash wounds and told the police
officer who found him that he had been abducted and cut by two
men. 03 But, at the hospital, Manes admitted to reporters "that his
wounds were self-inflicted and that he had fabricated the story of
his abduction."10 The appellate court agreed with the trial court
that this evidence should be excluded because it was not probative
on the issue of the credibility of Manes's conspiratorial
statements.10 5
The appellate court's affirmation of the trial court's ruling was
deliberately not founded upon the language of Rule 608(b), forbid-
ding extrinsic evidence of specific instances of conduct to show un-
truthfulness.1 0 6 Rather, the opinion rests upon the trial court's dis-
cretion as set forth in Rule 608(b) itself. 0 7
H. Prior or Later Inconsistent Statements
It has been said that "[i]mpeachment by prior inconsistent
statement is the most frequently used mode of impeachment and,
perhaps, the simplest."' 0 8 Like most North Carolina lawyers and.
judges, I strongly agree with the first thought, and just as strongly
disagree with the latter thought.
Many commentators also believe that this is the most impor-
tant mode of impeachment.
Probably the single most effective means of attacking the testi-
mony of an adverse witness is to show that he previously made
statements in direct conflict with damaging testimony he has just
given in the trial. Properly done, exposing a prior inconsistent
statement can be an electrifying turning point in a trial.109
nied, 109 S. Ct. 1637 (1989).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 570.
106. Id.
107. Id. Accord United States v. Serna, 799 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1013 (1987).
108. YOUNGER, supra note 3, § 15.5 at 272.
109. McELHANEY, supra note 17, at 280.
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When one refers to an inconsistent statement of an at-trial
witness he is almost inevitably speaking about a prior statement,
one made prior to the witness getting on the stand to tell his
story."' But, reference to an inconsistent statement of a hearsay
declarant could just as easily refer to a later inconsistent state-
ment-a statement made after the hearsay declaration, but prior
to the hearsay declaration being introduced in court.
What is the significance of this obvious practical difference be-
tween prior inconsistent statements of an at-trial witness and a
subsequent or later inconsistent statement of a hearsay declarant?
Federal Rule 613(b)"' does not allow the impeaching lawyer to in-
troduce extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement of a
witness unless and until (1) that witness was first afforded the op-
portunity to explain or deny the statement and (2) the opposite
party was also afforded an opportunity to interrogate the wit-
ness. 12 The requirements of Rule 613(b), if required for hearsay
declarations, are impossible to meet. -
Recognizing this impossibility, the drafters of Federal Rule
806 eliminated the requirements of 613(b) for hearsay declarations
by adding the second sentence of Federal Rule 806: "Evidence of a
statement or conduct by the declarant at any time, inconsistent
with the declarant's hearsay statement, is not subject to any re-
quirement that the declarant may have been afforded an opportu-
nity to deny or explain."" 3
A good example of the application of Rule 806 occurred in
United States v. Bernal."' In this case a co-conspirator's hearsay
declaration was received in evidence against the defendant." 5 The
defense lawyer impeached that declarant by eliciting, on cross-ex-
amination of a prosecution witness, that this same co-conspirator
(the hearsay declarant) had given a quite different version which
110. See FED. R. EvID. 806 advisory committee's note, reprinted in large part
in N.C.R. EvID. 806 commentary.
111. North Carolina, though it should have, has not adopted an equivalent to
Federal Rule 613(b). The North Carolina commentary states that "since subdivi-
sion (b) [of Federal Rule 6131 is omitted, foundation requirements for admitting
inconsistent statements will be governed by case law. See 1 BRANDIS, supra note
16, § 48, at 228-29.
112. See FED. R. EvID. 613(b).
113. FED. R. EvID. 806.
114. 884 F.2d 1518 (1st Cir. 1989).
115. United States v. Bernal, 884 F.2d 1518, 1523 (1st Cir. 1989).
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exculpated the defendant from guilt." 6 Such evidence is received
not as substance evidence, but, rather as non-substance impeach-
ment evidence to be considered by the jury in determining the
hearsay declarant's credibility.1 1
7
I. Reputation for Veracity
The last of our nine modes of impeachment [of a witness on the
stand] differs from the first eight in that it is not used on cross-
examination of the witness. Instead, the lawyer who seeks to im-
peach [a testifying witness] calls, as part of the lawyer's own case,
another witness whose testimony consists of this ninth mode."'
Rule 608(a) is the key to this last mode of impeachment. It allows
the credibility of a witness to be attacked by evidence in the form
of opinion or reputation.
An old case showing an attack on a hearsay declarant is
Carver v. United States,"9 where the United States Supreme
Court held that a dying declarant "may be discredited by proof
that the character of the deceased was bad."1 20 A more modern
case, already discussed with respect to bias, et cetera, is Lechoco.
In that case the prosecutor cross-examined the defense psychia-
trists about the defendant's motive and interest.' 2 ' On review by
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, the court held
that the defense should have been allowed to offer evidence pursu-
ant to Rule 608(b) about the defendant's reputation for
truthfulness.'22
IV. THE EXTENSION OF RULE 806 TO RULE 703
By its express words, Rule 806 is wedded to Rule 801, which
refers to attacking or supporting the credibility of a hearsay de-
clarant. "Hearsay" is defined in Rule 801(c) as "a statement . . .
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."'
23
What, you may ask, can be a statement offered in evidence for a
purpose other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted? How
116. Id.
117. See 1 BRANDIS, supra note 16, § 46, at 219.
118. YOUNGER, supra note 3, § 15.5, at 277.
119. 164 U.S. 694 (1897).
120. Carver v. United States, 164 U.S. 694, 697 (1897).
121. United States v. Lechoco, 542 F.2d 84, 86-87 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
122. Id. at 86-88.
123. FED. R. EvID. 801(c).
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about Rule 703 Basis of Opinion Testimony By Experts, which in
pertinent part states that "the facts or data ...upon which an
expert bases an opinion ... need not be admissible in evidence.
1 ' 24
Can you impeach the facts or data on which the expert bases his
opinion, even though such (in legal fiction) have not been received
in evidence for their truth? One highly acclaimed and conservative
legal writer announces that you can:
Although Rule 806 only addresses issues concerning the attack or
support of the credibility of the declarant of a hearsay statement.
. .the principles underlying the rule apply equally to the declar-
ant of a statement not admitted as substantive evidence, but rea-
sonably relied upon by an expert witness in accordance with Rule
703. 125
The wisdom behind allowing a lawyer to impeach facts and
data used as a basis of expert opinion is exhibited in two cases, one
North Carolina and one federal. The federal case, Lechoco, as you
may recall appeared earlier; but, now I present it with the facts
modified just a bit. Suppose that Lechoco had talked to his several
psychiatrists (as he did) and they then talked to several other psy-
chiatrists. Since these other psychiatrists were more attuned and
experienced in declaiming upon the witness stand for filthy lucre,
they were the experts actually called to the stand. All of the things
the second set of psychiatrists had been told by the first set would
be the basis for the second set's expert opinion. Surely it isn't jus-
tice to say that this information isn't subject to impeachment?126
The second case is a recent case from the North Carolina
Court of Appeals, Segrest v. Gillette.12 7 In this wrongful death case
the major controversy, at trial and on appeal, was the admissibility
of a Miscellaneous Lab Slip (the "IGM slip"). 28 The IGM slip had
apparently been generated, created or fabricated and put in the
hospital records at least two years and nine months after the little
124. FED. R. EVID. 703.
125. M. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 806.1, at 988 (1986); 1
M. GRAHAM, MODERN STATE AND FEDERAL EVIDENCE 304 (1989).
126. See FED. R. EVID. 102 (requiring that the Rules of Evidence "be con-
strued to secure fairness in administration ... to the end that truth may be ascer-
tained . . .").
127. 96 N.C. App. 435, 386 S.E.2d 88 (1989), cert. granted, 326 N.C. 483, 392
S.E.2d 95 (1990) (medical malpractice wrongful death case involving a seven year
old girl).
128. Segrest v. Gillette, 96 N.C. App. 435, 438, 386 S.E.2d 88, 89-90 (1989),
cert. granted, 326 N.C. 483, 392 S.E.2d 95 (1990).
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girl's death.'29
The appellate court reversed the trial court for not giving a
Rule 105 limiting instruction to the jury about the IGM slip.'30
The Segrest court held that due to the IGM slip's belated entrance
into the hospital record, the IGM slip didn't pass admissible hear-
say muster under Rule 803(6) Business Records, and therefore did
''not possess the guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to justify
its admission into evidence.' 3' But the court went on to hold that
even though the IGM slip was inadmissible hearsay, it was admis-
sible to show the basis of the expert opinion testimony.'
' 32
Surely the facts of this case clearly show the absolute need to
apply the same impeachment techniques and values to facts and
data of experts as are used for hearsay. Trials are, after all, sup-
posed to be a search for the truth.
V. PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY: NOTICE OF HEARSAY
In civil cases, as a particular matter, discovery gives each side
to learn most everything about the other side's case. In essence we
have gone from trial by ambush to trial by avalanche.
But, in criminal cases there is somewhat less discovery.' 3 3 A
logical question a criminal defense attorney would ask is what pre-
trial and at-trial discovery of hearsay declarants' statements can I
get from the prosecution? The answer is not much, perhaps noth-
ing. For Rule 803 and Rule 804 exceptions to the hearsay rule,
there is probably no hope at all for pre-trial discovery."'
The real quarrel between the prosecution and the criminal de-
129. Id. at 440, 386 S.E.2d at 90.
130. Id. at 441, 386 S.E.2d at 91.
131. Id. at 440, 386 S.E.2d at 90.
132. Id. at 441, 386 S.E.2d at 91. This statement apparently assumes that the
Rule 703 decision as to whether or not the facts or data which the expert bases his
opinion upon is "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular
field in forming opinion" is a self-made call/decision by the testifying expert. By
far, the better view is that it is a discretionary decision to be made by the trial
judge pursuant to Rule 103. But, in dicta (I think), the North Carolina Court of
Appeals has indicated the paid expert should make the call. See Barbecue Inn,
Inc. v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 88 N.C. App. 355, 363 S.E.2d 362 (1988).
133. In North Carolina, discovery in criminal trials is governed by N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 15A-901 to -908 (1988). In federal court it is FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 and 18
U.S.C. § 3500 (1988) which govern.
134. It is unlikely that either of these are covered by the Jencks Act or N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(a) (i.e. they are not vicariously or otherwise statements of
the defendant). See 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(b) (1988).
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fense may be to what extent, if any, the defense is entitled to dis-
covery of co-defendants' and co-conspirators' statements. Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 gives no pre-trial discovery relief
whatsoever. The rule does not provide for any discovery of co-de-
fendants' statements at all. This is narrower than the pre-trial dis-
covery provided by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-903(b)(1) and (2). Basi-
cally, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-903(b)(1) allows a defendant to learn
before trial the details of a co-defendant's statement which the
state intends to offer at a joint trial of the defendants. 135
You might wonder why the language of Federal Criminal Pro-
cedure Rule 16, which provides the defendant with pre-trial dis-
covery (for the most part) of "any statement made by the defend-
ant,"" 6 does not cover the statement of a co-conspirator and co-
defendant. In United States v. Roberts,'37 a three judge panel of
the Fourth Circuit held that Rule 16 did provide pre-trial discov-
ery of such statements.3 8 But that decision was reversed en banc
by the Fourth Circuit where the court construed Rule 16 literally
and said the defendant was entitled to pre-trial discovery only of
statements made by the defendant himself, and not those which
would be imputed to him as vicarious admissions. 139 Since N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 15A-903(a) uses the identical language of "statements
made by the defendant,"' 4 ° the same legal result may follow in
North Carolina state court. It depends upon how persuasive Rob-
erts (panel or en banc) is to our state courts.
At trial, discovery in federal court is controlled by the Jencks
Act "' and in state court by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-903(f). Basically
those statutes call for the prosecuting attorney to furnish prosecu-
tion witness statements to the defense after such'a witness has
completed his direct examination." 2 Reading these statutes in con-
junction with the aims of Rule 806, it would appear that hearsay
statements also should be so furnished."3 But this is a Pyrrhic vic-
135. See State v. Lake, 305 N.C. 143, 286 S.E.2d 541 (1982).
136. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(A).
137. 703 F.2d 580 (4th Cir. 1986), rev'd en banc, 811 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1987).
138. United States v. Roberts, 703 7.2d 580, 581 (4th Cir. 1986), rev'd en
banc, 811 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1987).
139. United States v. Roberts, 811 F.2d 257, 259 (4th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
140. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(a) (1988).
141. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1988).
142. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(f) (1988).
143. This should be the case notwithstanding the fact that the narrow defini-
tion of "statement" in each of these statutes does not cover hearsay declarants'
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tory inasmuch as those statements would have already been read
or told to the jury on the direct exam, thus already having been
discovered.
VI. SUPPORTING OR REHABILITATING HEARSAY DECLARANTS
By the express words of Rule 806, whenever the credibility of
a hearsay declarant has been attacked, it "may by supported ...
by any evidence which would be admissible for those purposes if
[the] declarant had testified as a witness." '44 Frankly, there is a
paucity of reported cases dealing with this point, but two will be
discussed here. In Lechoco, the sequence of events was as follows:
defense psychiatric witnesses testified, at length, to what the de-
fendant (who chose not to testify) had told them about his
thoughts and actions. The prosecutor cross-examined the psychiat-
ric witnesses about their testimony and expert opinions, pointing
out that, at least to some extent, their opinions were based on what
the defendant had told the witnesses. 4 " By such questioning, the
prosecutor implied that the defendant's statements were motivated
by his desire to be acquitted. 4" Then the defense offered evidence
that the defendant enjoyed a good reputation for truthfulness
which the trial court refused to admit. 14 7
On appeal the ruling, of the trial judge was reversed.14 8 The
appellate court held that the prosecutor's cross-examination of the
psychiatrists constituted an attack upon the hearsay declarant's
(the defendant's) credibility as covered by Rule 806."9 The
Lechoco court stated that "in.light of this attack, the defendant is
permitted by Rule 806 to present supporting credibility evidence
notwithstanding his exercise of his Fifth Amendment right."1 50
The last case on this point shows the ramifications of co-con-
spirator statements. In United States v. Bernal 1' the prosecutor
put into evidence a co-conspirator statement by one Corsey that he
did not have cocaine at his own house, but had to go get it from his
statements.
144. FED. R. EVID. 806.
145. United States v. Lechoco, 542 F.2d 84, 86 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
146. Id. at 87.
147. Id. at 84.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 89 n.6.
151. 719 F.2d 1475 (9th Cir. 1983).
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connection. 152 This also included evidence that Corsey then drove
to Bernal's home and came back with Bernal and the drugs."53 The
defense attorney, on cross-examination of a DEA witness, got the
agent to testify that Corsey had said to him that the cocaine in
question had always been at his house, thus impeaching the hear-
say declarant, Corsey, and weakening the inference that Bernal
had supplied the drugs. 5 ' On redirect examination, the same DEA
agent was allowed to testify over objection that Corsey had stated
that same day that Bernal had told Corsey that Bernal would have
an associate deliver a pound of cocaine to Corsey's residence in a
couple of hours.1 55 Legal analysis, in reverse chronological order,
shows the evidentiary use of a co-conspirator's statement to bol-
ster, support, and rehabilitate a co-conspirator who had been im-
peached with a prior inconsistent statement after having become a
co-conspirator hearsay declarant on the prosecution's case-in-chief.
VII. EXAMINING HEARSAY DECLARANTS
The last sentence of Rule 806 allows "[a] party against whom
a hearsay statement has been admitted" to call the declarant as a
witness and "examine the declarant on the statement as if [he
were] under cross-examination. 1 56 At first blush, this appears sim-
ple enough and fair enough. When hearsay is used against you, by
golly, you should have the right to cross-examine the declarant.
But wait a minute. What if it's a civil case and one party is using
the deposition of the opposing party or those employed by or oth-
erwise identified with such opposing party? Wouldn't it be unfair
to allow the party whose own people were deposed as adverse wit-
nesses to have the flat, absolute statutory right to cross-examine
what in fact is a friendly witness? What you would have is this
party's own lawyer throwing out well-phrased leading questions
which provide this party's full story and contentions expressed in
the lawyer's well-chosen words, leaving the witness only to give as-
sent and legal substance to it by simply saying "yes."
The short answer to this dilemma is that the legal answer de-
pends upon whether this case is being tried in federal or state
court. That's because North Carolina decided to modify the lan-
152. United States v. Bernal, 719 F.2d 1475, 1477 (9th Cir. 1983).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1478.
155. Id.
156. FED. R. EVID. 806.
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guage of Federal Evidence Rules 801 and 806 for reasons that have
nothing to do with this problem, and the iron law of unintended
consequences has taken over.
In federal court such bogus cross-examination should not be
permitted by the trial judge.15 But this is not so in North Carolina
state courts! Note the critical differences between North Carolina
Rule 801 and 806 as compared to Federal Rule 806 and 801.158 In
North Carolina we treat all party admissions, personal and vicari-
ous, as being hearsay exceptions where the Federal Rules treat
these as hearsay exemptions. Under the specific categoric language
of Rule 806, I now hold that in our North Carolina state courts a
party who has had any kind of hearsay admissions used against
him via depositions, interrogatories, or otherwise, has the absolute
and unabridgeable right to (1) call that hearsay declarant as a live
witness and (2) examine him on the statement as if under cross-
examination.'"9
157. As stated by Louisell & Mueller:
Federal Rule 806 applies by its terms only in connection with declarants
whose out-of-court hearsay statements are admitted under [the Rule 803
and Rule 804] exceptions [or] in connection with declarants whose out-
of-court statements are received pursuant to [Federal Rule] 801(d)(2),
(C), (D), or (E). Thus it does not apply to a party-declarant whose state-
ment is received under Federal Rule 801(d)(2)(A) or (B), and therefore
Federal Rule 611 applies when such a party-declarant takes the stand to
explain away the statement, which means that ordinarily the questioning
is cast in the mode of direct examination.
4 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 6, at 1249 n.14.
158. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
159. Rule 611 has no application here.
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